By requiring both intention and causings to constitute human agency,this third view avoids the seeming overbreadth of our obligations ifeither intention or action alone marked such agency. Suppose ouragent-relative obligation were not to do some action such askill an innocent –is that obligation breached by a merelynegligent killing, so that we deserve the serious blame of havingbreached such a categorical norm (Hurd 1994)? (Of course, one might besomewhat blameworthy on consequentialist grounds (Hurd 1995), orperhaps not blameworthy at all (Moore and Hurd 2011).) Alternatively,suppose our agent-relative obligation were not to intend tokill—does that mean we could not justify forming such anintention when good consequences would be the result, andwhen we are sure we cannot act so as to fulfill such intention (Hurd1994)? If our agent-relative obligation is neither of these alone, butis rather, that we are not to kill in execution of an intention tokill, both such instances of seeming overbreadth in the reach of ourobligations, are avoided.


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